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For many countries, remittance behaviour by migrants is an important
component of their overall international ﬁnancial ﬂows. To date, the empir-
ical literature has analysed the propensity to remit as a function of migrants’
socio-economic characteristics. However, no studies have fully addressed
the empirical implications of remittance behaviour being determined in the
broader context of migrants’ labour, income and consumption allocation
strategy. On the contrary, the migrant’s income has almost always been
treated as exogenous in this context. The aim of this study is to estimate
a remittance equation that detects the main determinants of remittance be-
haviour while addressing endogeneity and reverse causality relationships
between remittances, income, consumption and savings. Moreover, since a
large share of individuals do not remit money at all, an instrumental vari-
able variant of the double-hurdle selection model is proposed and estimated
by LIML.
A sending country perspective is adopted in the empirical analysis by
considering the ﬁrst cohort of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to
Australia. We ﬁnd that endogeneity is substantial and that estimates ob-
tained by the methods previously employed in the literature may be very
misleading if given a behavioural interpretation. Our results conﬁrm some
theoretical predictions and shed light on others; notably, we show that “self-
ish” motives in remitters are at least as important as “altruistic” motives.
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11 Introduction
The history of industrialisation and economic development intertwines inextricably
with the history of migration and remittance ﬂows. In some countries, the industrial
take-off was ﬁnanced, directly and indirectly, by the remittances of their emigrants. For
example, in Italy during the ﬁrst 15-year period of the twentieth century the average
amount of remittances was estimated to be around 450 million lire per year, a value
greater than the annual internal revenue from tax on earned income (De Clementi,
1994; Masullo, 2001), approaching 6 percent of the Italian GDP (Esteves and Khoudur-
Cast´ eras, 2009). In other countries, the immigrants’ labour supply, consumption, in-
vestments and the stimulus they produced to national savings and foreign capital were
primary growth engines (Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Solimano, 2003).
Nowadays, the situation is not very different from the past. Remittance ﬂows rep-
resent a major source of income and foreign exchange revenue for many developing
countries. According to the Migration and Remittances Factbook, remittance ﬂows to
developing countries increased from 84.5 billion US dollars to 221.3 billion in 2006, rep-
resenting 1.9% of developing countries GDP, 22% of global foreign direct investments
and almost 245% of ofﬁcial development aid. At the same time, for immigration coun-
triesremittancescanbeasizeableandcostlyoutﬂowofcapital. Forexample, remittance
outﬂows from Australia rose from 1,053 million US dollars in 2000 to 2,815 million in
2006 (equivalent to 0.4% of GDP) 1.
In this perspective, a proper understanding of the individual motivations and deter-
minants of remitting behaviour is a key step in analysing the dynamics of remittance
ﬂows at the aggregate level and in designing policies to attract remittances from abroad
or, conversely, to keep incomes and savings of migrants in the host country. In this pa-
per, we analyse the remittance strategy of a panel of immigrants coming to Australia
from 125 different countries. We estimate a simultaneous-equation model with double
censoring, where immigrants’ earnings, consumption and remittances are jointly deter-
mined. Moreover, we test whether the ﬁnancial development and institutional quality
of the country of origin boost or weaken migrants’ propensity to remit.
In their path-breaking study on motivations to remit, Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest
a taxonomy distinguishing three main drives of remittances: “pure altruism”, when mi-
grants derive utility from the utility of family and friends at home, “pure self-interest”,
when migrants are moved by the desire to acquire material and immaterial (reputation,
prestige) assets at home; “tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest”, when remit-
tances are the result of contractual arrangements between migrants and parents left at
home enforced by a mix of altruistic and self-interested forces2.
The pure altruistic attention to looking after close relatives in the origin-country is
certainly the motive for remitting which is most cited and studied in the literature
1Migration and Remittances Factbook (2008). Similarly, Dustmann and Mestres (2009) report that in
Germany remittance outﬂows were 0.3% of GDP in 2003.
2Rapoport and Docquier (2006), Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007), Carling (2008) and Stark (2009) pro-
vide exhaustive and updated reviews of modern microeconomic theoretical and empirical literature
on remittances.
2(Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Banerjee, 1984). However, remittances can also reﬂect a
sort of payment for goods and services received by migrants from parents and friends
in the home country. For example, remittances can be the repayment of investments
in migrants’ education, transfer expenses to the destination country and other migra-
tion costs met by the family of origin (Brown, 1997; Poirine, 1997). In addition, while
abroad, migrants may ask relatives to take care of their land, house or children and the
money sent is a funding element of this exchanging scheme (Cox, Eser, and Jimenez,
1998). Finally, remitting behaviour can be an investment strategy in inheritance, where
migrants remit to guarantee themselves the possibility to inherit once parents die (Hod-
dinott, 1992), or it may be the result of a broader intra-familial insurance arrangement
to reduce the effects of income volatility in developing countries (de la Briere, Sadoulet,
de Janvry, and Lambert, 2002).
Discriminating among remittance motivations empirically has proved to be a very
challenging task. Theoretical predictions on remittance determinants seldom translate
into clear-cut empirical tests. On the other hand, available datasets are often largely
incomplete, devoid of a time proﬁle and collected either at the sending or receiving end,
hence lacking important information to match migrants’ and recipients’ households3.
Moreover, any attempts to build empirical models, capable of identifying the driving
factors behind remittance behaviour in a satisfactory way, have been stumped by the
problems of the endogeneity of the major determinants of remittances and the inﬂuence
of unobserved third factors.
Recently, a few studies have addressed the issues of reverse causation and omitted
variables withregard tothe wealthand income ofrelatives backhome (Osili,2007; Yang
and Choi, 2007) and the migrants’ intention to return to the home country (Dustmann
and Mestres, 2009). Surprisingly enough, however, no previous studies have been con-
cerned with the endogeneity of immigrants’ income4 and saving behaviour5. Yet it is
highly conceivable that people who wish to remit a greater amount of money agree to
increase the number of hours worked per week. In addition, greater earnings by immi-
grants in the host country are arguably the output of the unobserved family-of-origin
investments in their education, thereby causing a (gratitude or money) debt for im-
migrants that remittances repay. Similar concerns hold for consumption: immigrants
could choose to reduce consumption in the host country in order to increase transfers
to the home country or could prefer to invest their savings in earning assets rather than
in buying property or other durables.
In this paper, we set remittances in the broader context of work and consumption
3An exception is represented by the paper by Osili (2007), where migrants are considered together with
their respective origin-families. Such complete information, on the other hand, comes together with a
very limited number of observations (61 pairs).
4A notable exception is Hoddinott (1994). However, in that paper the problem is dealt with simply by
showing that for Hoddinott’s dataset the Hausman exogeneity test fails to reject the null hypothesis
that migrants’ earnings are exogenous.
5A number of papers have analysed remittance and saving decisions of migrants jointly (Merkle and
Zimmermann, 1992; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Sinning, 2007; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009).
However, without exception, these papers proceed by estimating separate reduced-form models for
the different types of transfers and savings, among which the income of migrants can be allocated.
3decisions, by estimating a three-equation model. The censored nature of remittances
is dealt with by using a double-hurdle model (Cragg, 1971). This model is similar to
the better known Tobit and Heckit models, typically used in the remittance literature
(Funkhouser, 1995; Brown, 1997; Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002); in fact, it nests Tobit
as a special case, and arguably provides higher generality than both, since absence of
remittances by an individual may be ascribed either to unwillingness or to a ﬁnancial
constraint. However, this choice also poses an econometric issue. Although consid-
ered by theoretical econometric literature (Blundell and Smith, 1994), the double-hurdle
model with instrumental variables has not yet been used in the applied literature: in
this paper, we develop a LIML estimator for the double-hurdle model with endogenous
regressors, so as to address endogeneity and the selection mechanism at the same time.
In the second part of the paper, we exploit the cross-country dimension of our dataset
to explore the relationship between the ﬂow of remittances and the ﬁnancial sector and
institutional development in the home country. While a growing number of macro
studies are devoted to the ﬁnance- and institutions-remittance nexus6, as far as we
know, ours is the ﬁrst paper in the literature which provides microeconometric evi-
dence on the causal effect of the development of formal ﬁnancial intermediaries and
the quality of institutions on migrants’ remittances.
By way of preview, although our results cannot exclude the existence of an altruistic
motivation to remit, they indicate a prevalence of the exchange motives in governing
remittances. First, once endogeneity is taken into account, the hypothesis of unit elas-
ticity of remittances to pre-transfer income (predicted by the selﬁsh model) cannot be
rejected, while individual consumption is negatively correlated to remittances. Second,
theamountofmoneysenttothecountryoforiginincreaseswithimmigrants’education
but the likelihood of remittances does not, which is consistent with the loan repayment
hypothesis. Third, the home country per capita GDP (that we use as a proxy for the
pre-transfer recipients’ income) positively affects the amount transferred but decreases
the likelihood of remittances, once again in line with the exchange hypothesis.
As for the macro-determinants of migrants’ remittances, a well-developed ﬁnancial
sector in the country of origin seems to exert a positive effect on remittances. In the
same way, lower ﬁnancial risk in the home country is positively correlated with the
amount remitted. By contrast, remittances seem to be positively correlated to higher
political and economic risks, which suggests the existence of a sort of substitution effect
between ﬁnancial assistance to home-family and the quality of local institutions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the double-
hurdle maximum likelihood estimator with instrumental variables. In Section 3, we
provide a detailed description of our dataset, the variables and the models we estimate.
Results are presented in Sections 4, 5 and 6. In Section 7, we conclude.
6Amongst others, see Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjaha (2005), Freund and Spatafora (2005), Aggarwal,
Demirguc ¸-K¨ unt, and Martinez Peria (2006), Niimi and Ozden (2006), Bettin and Zazzaro (2009), Catri-




The task of building an empirical model for migrants’ remittances is a complex one:
on the one hand, one has to take into account the fact that the decision of whether to
remit money at all may be partly separated from the decision on the amount of the
remittance7. On the other, the latter decision is likely to be made jointly with other
choices on labour supply and consumption.
The ﬁrst aspect can be dealt with by using empirical models with some form of en-
dogenous censoring, such as the Heckman selection model (Hoddinott, 1994; Aggarwal
and Horowitz, 2002). In our view, however, it is more appropriate to use a double-
hurdle model, since an individual who does not send money abroad is not necessarily
uninterested in doing so, but may be constrained by lack of ﬁnancial resources.
The double-hurdle model is a commonly employed technique for estimating models
with double censoring. In the literature, the earliest reference is Cragg (1971), in which
the following model is analysed:
y
i = x0
ib + #i (1)
s
i = z0










sian variates (of course, V(ui) = 1 is assumed for identiﬁcation). Hence the name “in-
dependent double-hurdle” model.
Subsequent literature has extended the base model in a number of ways, the most
notable of which is doubtlessly the so-called “dependent” model, in which the zero















This model has been used in countless applications, such as labour market studies (the
classic reference here is Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987), but recent examples are Car-
doso, Fontainha, and Monfardini (2008) or Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2007)) or, most
notably, demand analysis for certain type of goods such as tobacco or alcohol, from
Jones (1989) onwards. Estimation is typically carried out by maximum likelihood8.
The use of a double-hurdle model in the empirical modelling of transfer decisions,
although uncommon, is not new: a double-hurdle model is used in a similar context by
7In Delpierre and Verheyden (2009) a theoretical model is presented, in which the decision where to make
remittances is at least partly separated from the decision on the actual amount remitted.
8A common reference is Jones (1992), who popularised a reasonably simple technique for maximising
the log-likelihood numerically.
5Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998), via a somewhat ad-hoc two-step method instead of max-
imum likelihood. A recent paper by Sinning (2007) also uses a double-hurdle model,
but only in its restricted independent version. Neither article tackles the problem of
endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
2.2 The double-hurdle model with endogenous regressors
In order to accommodate the problem at hand, the above model must be modiﬁed to
handle endogenous regressors in equation (1). The general problem of the estimation
of simultaneous-equation systems with censoring has been comprehensively analysed
in Blundell and Smith (1994). However, our problem is considerably simpler: as an



















is the vector of endogenous regressors (in our context, pre-transfer immigrants’ income
and consumption) and Z0
i = (X0
1i,X0
2i) is the vector of exogenous variables.




i = a0Zi + ui (5)
Yi = PZi + hi = P1X1i + P2X2i + hi (6)
As ui has unit variance and uijhi  N(l0S 1hi,w2), with w2  1   l0S 1l, we can
write
s
i = a0Zi + l0S 1hi + wi
where wi  ui   E(uijhi) and V(wi) = w2.
We then have
y
i = g0Yi + b0X1i + #i (7)
which is our structural relation. Note that #i may be correlated to hi (causing endo-
geneity) and/or to ui (giving rise to the dependent double-hurdle model, as opposed
to Cragg’s formulation). Assume now that the correlation between #i and hi can be
modelled as
#i = q0hi + vi (8)
which, for example, would be the case under joint normality. This way, vi is linearly
independent from hi, although it may be correlated with ui. As a consequence, we have
y
i = g0Yi + b0X1i + q0hi + vi.
9See Blundell and Smith (1994), footnote 1.
6With the joint normality assumption, one may write
y
i j(Zi,hi)  N(g0Yi + b0X1i + q0hi,s2)
Conditionally on hi (that is, treating Yi as given), the censoring mechanism works
exactly as in the ordinary double-hurdle model: deﬁne a binary variable
di = I[(s
i > 0) ^ (y
i > 0)]
where I(A) = 1 if A is true and 0 if A is false. The observed amount of remittances is
Ri = diy
i , which reads as: an individual will send a positive amount overseas only if
she intends to do so in the ﬁrst place (s
i > 0) and has enough money to do it (y
i > 0).
This variable may be rewritten as
di = I
h



















where F2() is the cumulative distribution function of the double normal, s2 = V(vi)
and the r is the correlation between wi and vi.
Hence, the log-likelihood (conditional on hi) for individual i can be written as
`c










g0Yi + b0X1i + q0hi
s

The full log-likelihood can be recovered by adding to `c
i the marginal log-likelihood for
hi, which is
`m
i = const  1/2
h
lnjSj + (Yi   PZi)0S 1(Yi   PZi)
i
.
It is worth noting that we are not estimating a structural form for the selection equa-
tion, but rather its unrestricted reduced form. In our opinion, the theoretical arguments
whichsuggesttreatingincomeandconsumptionasendogenousintheremittanceequa-
tion do not apply in the selection equation (5): the selection equation models the ex ante
psychological propensity of an individual to send money abroad and imposing over-
identifying restrictions here would be adventurous at best.
72.3 Numerical issues
Since the ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum cannot be solved analytically, a numer-
ical maximisation procedure is needed10. Although our estimation technique is a fairly
straightforward application of numerical maximum likelihood, in some cases standard
numerical procedures may not yield optimal results, since the log-likelihood function
may have multiple maxima. Consistency of maximum likelihood estimators is known
to stem from the fact that the expected value of the log-likelihood has a unique maxi-
mum at q0 and uniform convergence of the observed log-likelihood to its expectation11.
However, the observed log-likelihood may well have multiple maxima in ﬁnite sam-
ples. In these cases, it is reasonable to take the global maximum as the ML estimator.
Numerical methods, however, do not guarantee that the algorithm stops at the global
maximum, since they may get stuck in a local maximum.
With our dataset, we found that in several instances this was indeed the case. For
some speciﬁcations, there were two maxima, corresponding to two different values of
the correlation coefﬁcient r.12 In order to circumvent this problem, we used the follow-
ing computational strategy: given a value of r, carry out the maximum likelihood es-
timation of the remaining parameters, thus obtaining a restricted estimate ˆ y(r) (where
y is a vector gathering all the other parameters). This procedure was repeated over a
grid of values for r from -0.9 to 0.9 with increments of 0.1; the value of ˆ y(r) yielding
the maximum likelihood was then used as the starting point for the maximisation of
the unrestricted log-likelihood. We found this procedure to be mildly time-consuming,
but very effective.
10We used the BFGS implementation provided by gretl; see Cottrell and Lucchetti (2009). In or-
der to ensure that parameter s remains positive during the numerical search, the log-likelihood is
reparametrised in terms of lns. For similar reasons, the unconstrained parameters on which the
marginal log-likelihood function `m
i is based are not the elements of S itself, but rather those of the
Cholesky factorisation of S 1. In practice, `m
i , the second component of the log-likelihood, is com-
puted as
`m




where K is a lower-triangular matrix such that KK0 = S 1 and xi = K0(Ri   P0Zi). This has two
advantages: not only is a matrix inversion avoided, but the determinant of K (which is by construction














11A classic exposition of the argument is found in Amemiya (1985).
12This appears to be a little-known feature of the dependent double-hurdle model. To our knowledge, no
systematic investigation has been carried out on this matter.
82.4 Hypothesis testing
Once estimation is carried out, it becomes possible to test for several hypotheses: the
hypothesis of exogeneity of Yi, which is particularly interesting for the interpretation
of the results, can be easily carried out via a Wald test on q and poses no particular
problems.
Another test of interest is a test for the over-identiﬁcation restrictions implied by
equation (7). This has no obvious economic interpretation, but is nevertheless impor-
tant to judge the appropriateness of the choice of instruments. To see how the test is
carried out, substitute (6) and (8) into (7) to get
y




once the structural parameters are estimated by LIML, all it takes is to compute the
score matrix of the unrestricted model for the corresponding values of m1, m2 and m3
and perform a score (conditional moment) test via an OPG artiﬁcial regression (see
Davidson and MacKinnon (1984)).
Testing for the existence and the actual working of the selection mechanism is a more
complex matter: on the one hand, it should be ascertained whether a selection mech-
anism is in fact present. This could be accomplished by comparing the double-hurdle
model to an ordinary Tobit model. On the other, a comparison with a sample selection
model ` a la Heckman would shed light on the nature of censoring. If a Heckit-type cen-
soring occurred, then each individual who chooses to remit would generate a non-zero
ﬁgure for the actual remittances sent; put differently, zero remittances would indicate
unambiguouslythattheindividualhasnointentiontoremitmoneyhome, andthereare
noindividualswhoareﬁnanciallyconstrained. Bycontrast, ifthecensoringmechanism
is double-hurdle, zero remittances could result from potential, but income-constrained
remitters.






9The difference between the Tobit, Heckit and double-hurdle models can be illustrated
considering Figure 1. An individual is represented by a point on the plane, where the X-
axis indicates the amount that the individual could afford to send abroad and the Y-axis
indicates her psychological propensity to make remittances. The Tobit model assumes
that non-remitters belong to the area A or, equivalently, that areas B and C contain
no individuals (anyone would remit if they could); in the Heckman sample selection
model observable non-remitters belong to areas B and C and no individuals belong to
A (so that the only thing that matters is the a priori decision whether to remit or not).
In the double-hurdle model, a non-remitter could belong to any of the three areas A, B
and C: there may be some people who, although inclined to make remittances, cannot
afford to.
Testing procedures to discriminate between competing models of selection are more
difﬁcult to set up for two reasons: ﬁrst, the three models are non-nested (the double-
hurdle model being of the dependent variety); second, a comparison on the structural
form would entail estimation of IV varieties of the Tobit and Heckman model, which is
far more difﬁcult than the ordinary. These difﬁculties were circumvented by running
Vuong’s test (see Vuong (1989)) for comparing non-nested models on the unrestricted
reduced form of the three models. Vuong’s test is used for comparing non-nested mod-
els in terms of the difference in their respective Kullback-Leibler distance from the (un-






i ) is the i-th contribution to log-likelihood for model A (B). Under the












is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal random variable. Large positive
(negative) values are taken as evidence in favour of model A (B).
3 Data and variables
3.1 The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia
The dataset we use is the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA), a
longitudinal study of recently arrived visaed immigrants undertaken by the Common-
wealth Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.
We consider the ﬁrst cohort of the LSIA (LSIA1), that was selected from visaed immi-
grants aged 15 years and over, who arrived in Australia between September 1993 and
August 199513.
13The sampling unit is the Primary Applicant (PA), the person upon whom the approval to immigrate was
based. The population for the survey consisted of about 75,000 PAs and was stratiﬁed by the major visa
10Questionnaires cover different topics: the migrant’s family in Australia, the immigra-
tion process, the initial settlement, ﬁnancial assets and transfers (remittances), working
status, income, consumption expenditures, education and English knowledge, health,
citizenship and return visits to the former country. All this information gives an in-
comparable socio-economic picture of immigrants, that is essential to understand their
remittance behaviour.
Individuals were interviewed three times between six months and three years from
their arrival in Australia. In the ﬁrst two waves remittances are designed as a discrete
ordered variable, while in the third wave they are continuous. In principle, it would be
possibletoexploitallthreewavesbyusinganintervalIVregressionmodel, asproposed
by Bettin and Lucchetti (2009). However, the estimation of an instrumental variable
interval double-hurdle model would be quite hard to implement. Moreover, we would
lose precious information by transforming the continuous remittance variable from the
third wave into a discrete one. Therefore, we chose to limit our analysis to the third
wave.
The initial sample included 5,192 individuals, but due to sample attrition immigrants
interviewed in the third wave fell to 3,752 (2,160 men and 1,592 women). The intervie-
wees came from 125 countries. The most represented region is Asia, followed by Eu-
rope, Africa and the Middle East, which taken together represent the origin for almost
90% of immigrants in the sample. Table 5 shows that ﬁve out of the ten main countries
of origin are located in South-East Asia, suggesting that geographic distance plays an
important role in migration choices. However, the largest number of immigrants come
from the United Kingdom (8.40% of the sample), which suggests that cultural afﬁnities,
common language and past colonial relationships also affect the locational choice of
migrants.
In all, 1,154 immigrants (31%) responded positively when asked about their attitude
towards remittances. Half of them sent less than 1000 AUS $ since the previous inter-
view, whiletheaverageamountofmoneyremittedisaround2,550AUS$. Interestingly,
there seems to be a pattern: immigrants from richer (poorer) countries are less (more)
likely to send remittances, but if they do, they send larger (smaller) amounts (see Table
5 and Figure 2).
Analysingthenumberofremittersbycountryofbirth, theIraqisarethemostlikelyto
send money back home (62.5% of Iraqi immigrants in LSIA1) followed by the Afghans
(58.7%) and the Filipinos (58%); the share of remitters is much lower for immigrants
from high-income countries (as an example, the ﬁgure is 10.7% for the USA and 14.3%
for the UK). Conversely, the average amount remitted by Japanese immigrants (11100
AUS $) is the largest in the sample, and is also much larger than the amount that immi-
grantscomingfromsimilarcountries(intermsofpercapitaGDP)liketheUK,Germany
or Italy send back home. By contrast, among poor countries Cambodians’ remittances
(1061 AUS $) are lower than the average.
groups and by individual countries of birth.
113.2 The empirical model
3.2.1 Remittance equation variables
The main remittance equation in the model we estimate is:
Ri = a + byYi + bcCi + d0X1i + g0Zj(i) + #i (9)
where Ri is the amount of money sent home every year by the immigrant i14, Yi is
the yearly pre-transfer income of immigrants’ household in Australia and Ci the yearly
household’s consumption expenditures (all variables are in logarithm). Consumption
is calculated as the sum of all the different consumption items singled out in the ques-
tionnaire: food, transports, clothes, health, expenditures for the children and for the
house (gas, electricity etc.). As immigrants’ income and consumption are recorded by
intervals in the survey, we take the midpoints of the intervals.
X1 is a vector of exogenous immigrant characteristics that theory and previous em-
pirical literature indicate as possible explanatory variables of remittance behaviour: (i)
the immigrant gender, by an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the immi-
grant is a male (MALE); (ii) the age of the immigrant and its square (AGE, AGE2); (iii)
the time (in years) elapsing from the arrival in Australia (TIME); (iv) a citizenship indi-
cator that takes the value of 1 if the immigrant has obtained, applied to obtain or has
the intention to apply for Australian citizenship (CITIZENSHIP); (v) the formal qual-
iﬁcation of the immigrant (SCHOOLING) proxied by four dummies corresponding to
PhD/MA degree, BA degree or diploma, 10/12 years of schooling, and 9 or less years
of schooling (the excluded category is the immigrant with a PhD or an MA degree); (vi)
a dummy for the presence of close relatives in the country of origin15 (RELATIVES).
Finally, Zj(i) includes variables relative to the home country j of individual i, which
aim to capture parental family characteristics for which the LSIA survey does not keep
records. In the baseline speciﬁcation, we consider the log of the mean per capita GDP
over the period 1992-2000 (GDP PC) as a proxy for the economic conditions of relatives
at home16.
Furthermore, the log of the distance between Australia and the country of origin
(DISTANCE) is considered because of its inﬂuence on the relations with the home coun-
try. Being far away raises the cost of visiting home and also reduces the frequency of
contacts at a distance, due to different time zones, thus weakening the strength of altru-
istic feelings. At the same time both costs associated to migrating to the host country
and to transferring money back to the origin family increase with the distance from the
14Inthequestionnaire, immigrantswereoriginallyaskedabouttheamountofmoneysentbackhomefrom
the previous interview. However, since data concerning income and consumption are reported on a
yearly basis, we also transformed remittances accordingly. In addition, there were a few observations
reporting a positive amount of remittances but equal to 1 AUS $ per year. Since we interpreted these
either as due to misreporting or as transfers whose rationale is beyond the scope of our analysis on the
traditional motives to remit, we set them to zero.
15It refers to partner/spouse, children, parents and siblings.
16GDP data are from the World Development Indicators database.
12home country17.
Other country-speciﬁc variables were also considered as possible additions to the
baseline model. In particular, sections 5.3 and 6 contain an analysis of other several
macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and institutional quality indicators.
3.2.2 Instrumental variables
The set of instruments for pre-transfer immigrants’ income Yi and consumption Ci in-
cludes X1i, Zj(i) and X2i. The ﬁrst two subsets contain the regressors just illustrated
above for the remittance equation. X2i, instead, is a vector of ﬁve variables to address
endogeneity of income and consumption. The ﬁrst two instruments refer to the knowl-
edge of the English language. In particular, we build two indicator variables taking the
value of 1 if the ﬁrst spoken language of the immigrant is English (FIRST ENG) and
if the immigrant states he/she has a good knowledge of English (GOOD ENG). The
third instrument is a dummy variable stating whether the immigrant lives in an urban
(CITY = 1) or a rural environment (CITY = 0). The last three instruments refer to
the composition of the immigrant household in Australia: a dummy for the presence of
children in the immigrant household (CHILD), a dummy for the presence of the partner
in the immigrant household (SPOUSE) and the log of the number of members in the
immigrant household plus one (FAMILY N)18.
Our assumption is that a higher level of English proﬁciency would affect immigrants’
income in a positive way but without any direct effect on the amount of remittances.
Similarly, we expect the composition of the family in Australia to contribute to deter-
mining earned income and consumption patterns, and via such variables, remittances.
In particular, we expect income to increase with the number of household members
and with the presence of a partner and to decrease in the presence of children. Con-
sumption, on the other hand, should be positively affected by all the three instruments
regarding household composition. Finally, consumption patterns also depend on the
location of residence and expenditures might be higher if the immigrant’s household
lives in an urban instead of a rural environment. This is especially the case for a country
such as Australia where the outback is not densely populated.
4 Results: the baseline model
4.1 Income and consumption
In table 1 we report the results from our basic speciﬁcation for the remittance model,
while in table 7 in the Appendix we report the ﬁrst-stage regressions for income and
17Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) show that distance is indeed a key determinant of remittance bilateral
ﬂows at aggregate level, with a negative effect.
18As always, the hypothesis of exogeneity for any particular variable is open to criticism; however, it
should be kept in mind that we are estimating a structural form only for the remittances equation. As
a consequence, we are assuming that our instruments do not affect directly the amount of money sent
abroad. Instead, their direct effect on the propensity to remit is taken into account.
13Table 1: IV dependent double-hurdle model
Main equation
non-IV
coeff. std.err. z-stat p-value estimates
const 16.912 3.703 4.567 0.000 *** 1.048
MALE 0.244 0.105 2.332 0.020 ** 0.194
AGE 0.395 0.418 0.946 0.344 -0.378
AGE2 -0.061 0.052 -1.171 0.242 0.041
TIME 0.167 0.329 0.508 0.611 0.123
CITIZENSHIP -0.588 0.262 -2.244 0.025 ** -0.575 ***
RELATIVES 0.508 0.251 2.026 0.043 ** 0.337 ***
SCHOOLING 2 -0.337 0.137 -2.454 0.014 ** -0.221
SCHOOLING 3 -0.678 0.179 -3.795 0.000 *** -0.574 *
SCHOOLING 4 -0.913 0.195 -4.686 0.000 *** -0.691 **
GDP PC 0.186 0.084 2.221 0.026 ** 0.227 *
DISTANCE -0.329 0.147 -2.230 0.026 ** -0.165
INCOME 0.871 0.325 2.682 0.007 *** 0.143
CONSUMPTION -1.935 0.560 -3.457 0.001 *** 0.471
Selection equation
non-IV
coeff. std.err. z-stat p-value estimates
const 4.776 1.228 3.890 0.000 *** 4.973 *
MALE 0.128 0.064 2.001 0.045 ** 0.132 ***
AGE 0.321 0.219 1.471 0.141 0.380 ***
AGE2 -0.061 0.026 -2.340 0.019 ** -0.067 ***
TIME 0.056 0.237 0.236 0.814 0.024
CITIZENSHIP 0.289 0.130 2.226 0.026 ** 0.293 ***
RELATIVES 0.305 0.154 1.978 0.048 ** 0.314 ***
SCHOOLING 2 -0.058 0.085 -0.690 0.490 -0.049 **
SCHOOLING 3 -0.028 0.110 -0.259 0.796 -0.015
SCHOOLING 4 0.120 0.142 0.843 0.399 0.132 **
GDP PC -0.279 0.037 -7.562 0.000 *** -0.278 ***
DISTANCE -0.425 0.085 -4.984 0.000 *** -0.431 ***
GOOD ENG 0.100 0.086 1.162 0.245 0.122 ***
FIRST ENG -0.226 0.078 -2.908 0.004 *** -0.236 ***
CITY -0.077 0.174 -0.441 0.659 -0.179
CHILD -0.171 0.089 -1.917 0.055 * -0.177 ***
SPOUSE 0.282 0.091 3.106 0.002 *** 0.226 *
FAMILY N -0.103 0.095 -1.088 0.276 -0.156 **
s 1.119 0.032 35.490 0.000 *** 1.252 ***
r -0.071 0.220 -0.325 0.745 -0.480
Note: QMLE standard errors (see White (1982)). The log-likelihood is equal to -4382.30 in the IV estimation
and to -2221.19 in the simple double-hurdle model. The total number of cases is 2168 with 654 censored
observations. The c2
2 Wald test statistic for exogeneity for income and consumption is 28.598 (p-value:
6.17e-7). The c2
4 overidentifying restriction test statistic is 6.087 (p-value: 0.193). First-stage F-tests: 89.965
(income), 97.703 (consumption).
14consumption.
All our instrumental variables have a very signiﬁcant impact on income and con-
sumption and estimated coefﬁcients have the expected signs. In addition, the Wald
test strongly rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity for income and consumption, sug-
gesting the importance of accounting for reverse causality and simultaneity between
such variables and remittances, while the over-identiﬁcation test supports the validity
of the chosen instruments. The customary F-tests on the reduced forms show no sign
of instrument weakness.
Moving on to the main equation of the remittance model, the amount of money trans-
ferred to the family of origin depends positively on migrants’ pre-transfer income and
negatively on consumption expenditure. Both coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at
1% level of conﬁdence but the coefﬁcient for consumption is almost twice as large (in
modulus) than that for income. In particular, it is worth noting that the coefﬁcient on
income, measuring the elasticity of remittances to pre-transfer immigrant’s income, is
never signiﬁcantly different from 1. This ﬁnding is at odds with predictions of pure
altruistic models of remittances, while it is consistent with a pure exchange motivation
to remit19. By contrast, the elasticity of remittances to consumption is approximately
equal to  2. In addition, a joint test for by =  bc rejects the null with a p-value of
0.0024. This means that, income and other regressors being equal, when immigrants
increase their consumption what they cut is remittances more than savings in the host
country. However, this also indicates that an increase in an immigrant’s income fol-
lowed by a proportionally identical increase in his/her consumption, leaving the aver-
age propensity to consume unchanged, results in a decrease in the amount of money
he/she transfers to the family of origin.
4.2 Other determinants of remittances
The effects of immigrants’ gender and age on remittances are broadly in line with the
majority of previous studies. Male immigrants tend to transfer back home signiﬁcantly
greater amounts of money than females and are also more likely to remit20, while the
age of immigrants is not signiﬁcantly correlated with the intensity of transfers to the
family of origin (Funkhouser, 1995; Osili, 2007; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009). How-
ever, older immigrants are more likely to remit, albeit at a decreasing pace21.
Time elapsing from the arrival of immigrants to Australia has no signiﬁcant effect
on remittance decisions. This is in accordance with previous ﬁndings of Brown (1997),
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and Dustmann and Mestres (2009) and is consis-
tent with the altruistic motivation to remit, even if it should be noted that our sample
19See the Appendix for a simple model of altruistic and exchange motivations to remit.
20The greater propensity to remit of males is consistent with the ﬁndings of (Funkhouser, 1995; Aggarwal
and Horowitz, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009). By contrast,
Lucas and Stark (1985), Osaki (2003) and Naufal (2008) found that it is females who remit more.
21A joint test of signiﬁcance of AGE and AGE2 coefﬁcients shows that the relation with the probability to
remit is non-monotonic. An inverted U relationship between immigrants’ age and remittances is also
documented in Hoddinott (1994) and Clark and Drinkwater (2007).
15includes only recently arrived immigrants.
The citizenship status of immigrants can be relevant to explaining remittance deci-
sions, even if its effects are ambiguous. For example, to the extent that application for
citizenship indicates the willingness of immigrants to reside permanently, or for a long
time, in the host country we expect a negative relationship with transfers to the home
country. However, if the citizenship status goes along with more stable and protected
occupations in the host country and with access to wider forms of social protection, we
might observe that ‘citizen’ immigrants are more inclined to remit. Our ﬁndings con-
ﬁrm the existence of opposite effects for citizenship. In particular, we ﬁnd that immi-
grantswhodidapplyforAustraliancitizenshiparemorelikelytoremitbut, onaverage,
they also remit smaller sums. This suggests that they are more likely to consider Aus-
tralia their permanent country of residence and relax contacts with the family of origin.
At the same time, however, by being well integrated in Australian society, immigrants
who have obtained Australian citizenship can afford to send money back home with
higher frequency than non-citizen immigrants 22.
With regard to schooling variables, we ﬁnd that the probability of immigrants remit-
ting money is not signiﬁcantly correlated with their level of educational attainment.
However, in the main equation the coefﬁcients on schooling dummies are signiﬁcantly
negative and increasing in modulus, suggesting that, income being equal, the more ed-
ucated are the immigrants the greater is the amount of money they transfer home. The
positive correlation between education and remittances has been already documented
in the literature by, for example, Lucas and Stark (1985), Hoddinott (1994), Funkhouser
(1995) and Ilahi and Jafarey (1999), and has been taken as an important piece of evi-
dence in favour of the exchange (repayment) motivations to remit.
Unsurprisingly, as any remittance theory predicts, we ﬁnd that the presence of close
relatives in the country of origin affects both the decisions on whether to remit and the
amount actually remitted in a positive way23.
The distance from the home country and the cost of contacts with the origin fam-
ily have inconsistent effects on remittances. For example, altruistic senders might be
discouraged from transferring money back home if their sentiment decreases with the
distance from the family. Similarly, selﬁsh senders might be discouraged from remit-
ting faraway, if we admit that the enforcement of exchanges with relatives at home
can become more difﬁcult with the distance. However, by saving on visit expenses,
immigrants, whether altruistic or selﬁsh, can afford to send more money back home.
Further, if remittances repay migration costs, transfers to the home country should in-
crease with geographic distance. Our results show that distance plays a signiﬁcant role
both in the main equation and in the selection process. The farther the country of origin
22In a similar vein, the effects of legal status of the immigrant on remittances are not consistent across
the literature. For example, Konica and Filer (2009) report that legal Albanian emigrants remit more
than their illegal counterparts; by contrast, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and Markova and Reilly
(2007) found an opposite correlation for the case, respectively, of documented Mexican and Bulgarian
emigrants.
23Again in Funkhouser (1995) family relationships are shown to be relevant both to the decision whether
to remit and to the amount of money remitted. See also Clark and Drinkwater (2007).
16from Australia, the lower the propensity to remit and the lower the amount of money
remitted24.
As we stated, the LSIA survey does not contain information on the immigrants’ fam-
ily of origin. In order to circumvent this deﬁciency to some degree, we exploit the cross-
sectional nature of the dataset by introducing country-level variables. In particular, in
the baseline model we control for the per capita GDP in the immigrant country of ori-
gin. Regression results show that GDP exerts opposite effects in the main equation and
the selection equation: the income of immigrants being equal, the probability for origin-
households to receive a transfer is lower if they live in a rich country; however, on av-
erage the amount of money they receive is higher than for recipients in poor countries.
To the extent that GDP in the home country captures the living condition of the family
of origin, our evidence is consistent with predictions of the exchange bargaining-type
model of Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998). As they show, in contrast to the pure altruism
hypothesis, for exchange motivated immigrants an increase in the income of recipients
may raise the amount transferred, as the bargaining power of the latter is higher, but
decreases the likelihood of remittances, as the beneﬁts of participating in the exchange
with migrants are lower for recipients.
With regard to the instrumental variables included in the selection equation (recall
that in this case we estimate the reduced form), CHILD and FIRST ENG are nega-
tively associated with the likelihood of immigrants sending money back home, while
SPOUSEhasapositiveeffect. Consistentwiththepreviousliterature(ClarkandDrinkwa-
ter, 2007; Bollard, McKenzie, and Morte, 2009; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009), the pres-
ence of children in Australia reduces the probability of immigrants remitting. Some-
what surprisingly, instead, immigrants whose spouses are in Australia are more likely
to send remittances25. A possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that when both wife
and husband migrate, relatives of the enlarged family in the country of origin are left
devoid of the help of both the adult sons and this increases their ﬁnancial needs. More-
over, since we are estimating a reduced form, the positive sign of SPOUSE could hide
the positive effect of immigrant income on the probability to remit. Finally, immigrants
whose best spoken language is English are less likely to transfer money back home than
others. To the extent that FIRST ENG captures the strength of social and cultural links
to the country of origin, people who still do not consider English as their ﬁrst language,
after three years spent in Australia, probably view their homeland as the main centre
of their interests and are therefore more likely to remit.
24A similar result is found in Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008), where the aggregate amount of remittances
between pairs of countries are explained by means of a gravity model, showing that altruism is less of
a factor that commonly considered.
25This is in contrast with all the previous literature (see Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007)).
175 Robustness checks
5.1 Non-IV, Heckit and Tobit estimates
In the last column of Table 1, we report estimation results from the non-IV double-
hurdle model. The comparison with coefﬁcients from IV estimates provide a clear con-
ﬁrmation of the need to address the endogeneity of immigrants’ income and consump-
tion. First, when INCOME and CONSUMPTION are not instrumented, the income
elasticity of remittances appears to be much lower than 126, while the elasticity to con-
sumption is positive although not signiﬁcant. Moreover, the effect of education on the
amount remitted is economically and statistically less signiﬁcant than in IV estimates;
gender inﬂuences the likelihood of remitting but not the amount remitted, and the dis-
tance from the country of origin only makes remittances less likely.
To validate our choice to use a double-hurdle model, we perform two Vuong tests
comparing this model with, respectively, the Heckit and Tobit models. Table 8 in the
Appendix reports the results from the three different models. In order to use homoge-
nous speciﬁcations, we compare the double-hurdle model with the Tobit and Heckit
models on the basis of the unrestricted reduced form, thus avoiding to impose over-
identiﬁcation restrictions from the outset. The Vuong test clearly favours the double-
hurdle model versus the Tobit model. A selection mechanism needs therefore to be
included in the model, non remitters are not simply immigrants ﬁnancially constrained
and we need to model the decision whether to remit as a separate step from the decision
concerning the amount to remit. However, the Vuong test fails to reject the equivalence
of the double-hurdle model and the two-step Heckman procedure27.
Since the double-hurdle model accommodates both the case of immigrants who do
not remit because they are unwilling to send money back home and the case of im-
migrants who are ﬁnancially constrained, while the Heckit model considers all non-
remitters as people who do not want to remit, we can read the result of the Vuong test
as evidence that in our sample most non-remitters (if not all) fall into the category of
people who are not interested in remitting, instead of being ﬁnancially constrained.
5.2 Country-specic xed eects
Ideally, one may want to control for unobserved characteristics of the country of origin
by using a complete set of country dummies. In our case, however, this is not possible
for two reasons.
The most important reason is that, after adjusting for missing values, we have 102
different origin countries, but most of these countries are represented by a very small
number of households, often with no remitting households at all. Clearly, the inclu-
26Interestingly, a very similar result has been found by Sinning (2007). Using a non-IV double-hurdle
model he reported that the elasticity of remittances to income ranges from 0.09 to 0.53.
27If we look at the estimated coefﬁcients, double-hurdle and Heckit provide practically identical indica-
tions. By contrast, signiﬁcance and magnitude of coefﬁcients are quite different when using the Tobit
estimator.
18sionofdummyvariablesforsuchcountrieswouldcauseunsurmountableidentiﬁcation
problems and would make little sense anyway.
Secondly, even if we had a large enough sample size for each country, we already
have a few country-speciﬁc variables in our baseline speciﬁcation (distance, for one)
and including a complete set of country dummies would obviously force us to drop
those variables because of collinearity problems.
Hence, we decided to test the robustness of our baseline speciﬁcation by means of the
inclusion of a limited set of country-speciﬁc dummies, for those countries from which
we had at least 15 households and 5 remitting households.28 In practice, this is equiv-
alent to grouping all the remaining countries into a residual “other countries”category.
This choice led us to including 30 country dummies; it is worth noting that those 30
countries are the origin country for 1637 households out of 2168, so in fact our limited
set of country dummies covers 75.5% of our sample.
Results are not reported for the sake of brevity; however, they can be brieﬂy sum-
marised as follows.
 Country effects are very signiﬁcant: the maximised log-likelihood for the model
with country dummies equals  4249.25. Compared with the maximised log-
likelihood for the baseline model, this yields an LR statistic of 266.1, which leads
to rejecting the null hypothesis of joint insigniﬁcance at any signiﬁcance level.
 However, the remaining coefﬁcients are remarkably stable. Elasticities of remit-
tances with respect to income and consumption turn out to be 0.946 and  2.026,
respectively (both signiﬁcant at the 1% level). All other coefﬁcients are also very
similar to the ones in the baseline speciﬁcation. The only minor exception is the
coefﬁcient of GDP PC in the remittance equation, which equals 0.195 with a p-
value of 10.7%, while the coefﬁcient to GDP PC in the selection equation remains
negative and very signiﬁcant ( 0.285, with a standard error of 0.056), thus lend-
ing strong support to the idea that income in the home country affects remittances
mainly via the decision whether to remit or not, rather than via the amounts.
 All diagnostics tests (see subsection 5.1) remain virtually unchanged.
5.3 Controlling for other macroeconomic characteristics
In the baseline speciﬁcation we control for the economic conditions of recipients only
by means of per capita GDP in the home country. Here, we add two more macroeco-
nomic variables that can be correlated with the average income capacity of recipients:
the average growth of GDP in the period between 1992 and 2000 (GDP GROWTH) and
GDP volatility expressed as the standard deviation of Dln GDP in the same period
(GDP VOLATILITY). Both these variables contribute to capture the insurance motiva-
tion to remit due, respectively, to the long-run prospects and short-run uncertainty in
28Other thresholds were tried, with no appreciable differences.
19Table 2: IV dependent double-hurdle model: macro variables
Main equation
const 17.198 *** 16.413 *** 16.593 ***
MALE 0.234 ** 0.241 ** 0.237 **
AGE 0.387 0.350 0.346
AGE2 -0.060 -0.056 -0.055
TIME 0.186 0.153 0.162
CITIZENSHIP -0.629 *** -0.581 ** -0.588 **
RELATIVES 0.482 * 0.482 * 0.468 *
SCHOOLING 2 -0.345 ** -0.335 ** -0.336 **
SCHOOLING 3 -0.690 *** -0.681 *** -0.683 ***
SCHOOLING 4 -0.933 *** -0.930 *** -0.935 ***
GDP PC 0.199 ** 0.203 ** 0.207 **
GDP VOLATILITY -0.024 -0.009
GDP GROWTH 0.029 0.025
DISTANCE -0.315 ** -0.279 * -0.281 *
INCOME 0.849 *** 0.914 *** 0.025
CONSUMPTION -1.948 *** -1.980 *** 0.905 ***
Selection equation
const 4.633 *** 4.877 *** 4.505 ***
MALE 0.135 ** 0.129 ** 0.135 **
AGE 0.334 0.328 0.330
AGE2 -0.063 ** -0.062 ** -0.063 **
TIME 0.032 0.052 0.031
CITIZENSHIP 0.289 ** 0.288 ** 0.290 **
RELATIVES 0.332 ** 0.312 ** 0.330 **
SCHOOLING 2 -0.054 -0.057 -0.054
SCHOOLING 3 -0.022 -0.028 -0.019
SCHOOLING 4 0.134 0.123 0.136
GDP PC -0.279 *** -0.281 *** -0.278 ***
GDP VOLATILITY 0.019 0.023
GDP GROWTH -0.006 0.006
DISTANCE -0.414 *** -0.433 *** -0.404 ***
GOOD ENG 0.109 0.098 0.115
FIRST ENG -0.206 *** -0.225 *** -0.204 **
CITY -0.080 -0.080 -0.082
CHILD -0.168 * -0.169 * -0.168 *
SPOUSE 0.281 *** 0.279 *** 0.284 ***
FAMILY N -0.098 -0.104 -0.098
s 1.121 *** 1.118 *** 1.120 ***
r -0.113 -0.100 -0.123
Endog. test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overid. test (p-value) 0.128 0.093 0.060
Log-likelihood -4380.31 -4379.03 -4377.87
Total cases 2168 2168 2168
Uncensored 654 654 654
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.
20the parental family’s income29. For example, a positive coefﬁcient on income volatility
in the selection equation would indicate that, ceteris paribus, the probability of being a
remitter rises if the home country is exposed to stronger economic ﬂuctuations. Results
reported in Table 2 show that neither average GDP growth nor volatility prove signiﬁ-
cant in any speciﬁcation, even if the sign of coefﬁcients is consistent with the insurance
motive. In any event, the robustness of the other results, and in particular the high
signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients on income and consumption, are conﬁrmed.
6 Remittances, nancial development and institutional quality
In the last part of our study, we analyse the nexus between remittance behaviour and
the degree of ﬁnancial development and institutional quality in the immigrants’ coun-
try of origin.
This issue has recently attracted great research effort in the macroeconomic litera-
ture on remittances. The effects of ﬁnancial and institutional development in the home
country on the decisions to remit are diverse and inconsistent. On the one hand, the
development of ﬁnancial institutions is likely to inﬂuence the level of immigrants’ trust
in the country of origin as a sound environment in which to invest their own savings
and send remittances. Such a channel of inﬂuence is especially important for selﬁsh re-
mitters, for whom a solid and trustworthy economic environment can be key factors in
determining the geographical allocation of savings. In this vein, Freund and Spatafora
(2005) and Niimi and Ozden (2006) indeed show that the level of ﬁnancial develop-
ment of the home country seems to have a crucial and positive impact on remittance
inﬂows; similarly, Bettin and Zazzaro (2009) stress the complementarity between remit-
tances and ﬁnancial systems’ efﬁciency in the economic growth of developing coun-
tries. On the other hand, a substitution mechanism could also be at work (Giuliano and
Ruiz-Arranz, 2009): where credit markets do not function properly and borrowers are
constrained in their access to credit, remittances allow recipient households to bridge
ﬁnancial constraints.
The same ambiguity holds for the quality of institutions: well functioning home in-
stitutions might encourage migrants to transfer greater sums of money to relatives at
home; however, the presence of good institutions can render remittances less urgent.
Consistently, the available evidence is mixed. Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and
Quillin (2009) ﬁnd evidence in favour of complementarity between remittances and
the quality of institutions of developing countries: the positive correlation between
the two seems to imply that the growth enhancing effect by remittances is stronger
where institutions are sound30. On the contrary, Abdih, Chami, Dagher, and Montiel
(2008) suggest that remittance inﬂows and institutional quality can be substitutes, as a
great abundance of money remitted increases corruption and worsens the functioning
29In fact, GDP growth also control for the rate of return of capital in the home country, which is a relevant
factor for non-altruistic remitters.
30In a similar vein, Papaioannou (2009) shows that international ﬁnancial ﬂows from banks are positively
affected by the quality of institutions of the recipient country.
21Table 3: IV dependent double-hurdle model: ﬁnancial variables
Main equation
const 19.716 *** 19.369 *** 19.278 ***
MALE 0.303 *** 0.307 *** 0.296 ***
AGE 0.321 0.332 0.293
AGE2 -0.054 -0.054 -0.049
TIME -0.145 -0.118 -0.171
CITIZENZHIP -0.572 ** -0.593 ** -0.511 *
RELATIVES 0.469 * 0.473 * 0.468 *
SCHOOLING 2 -0.365 ** -0.369 ** -0.376 ***
SCHOOLING 3 -0.605 *** -0.611 *** -0.616 ***
SCHOOLING 4 -0.819 *** -0.893 *** -0.829 ***
GDP PC 0.054 0.048 -0.020
DEPOSITS 0.147 ***
CREDIT 0.144 *
LIQUID LIAB 0.384 ***
DISTANCE -0.256 * -0.204 -0.148
INCOME 1.065 *** 1.047 *** 1.006 ***
CONSUMPTION -2.251 *** -2.247 *** -2.153 ***
Selection equation
const 5.694 *** 5.515 *** 5.388 ***
MALE 0.113 * 0.113 * 0.111
AGE 0.206 0.203 0.214
AGE2 -0.047 * -0.046 * -0.048 *
TTIME -0.053 -0.040 -0.033
CITIZENSHIP 0.291 ** 0.287 ** 0.283 **
RELATIVES 0.197 0.210 0.216
SCHOOLING 2 -0.029 -0.028 -0.026
SCHOOLING 3 -0.021 -0.023 -0.023
SCHOOLING 4 0.133 0.110 0.109




DISTANCE -0.415 *** -0.411 *** -0.432 ***
GOOD ENG 0.022 0.034 0.039
FIRST ENG -0.223 *** -0.227 *** -0.222 ***
CITY 0.000 -0.005 -0.010
CHILD -0.188 ** -0.184 * -0.185 *
SPOUSE 0.275 *** 0.278 *** 0.274 ***
FAMILY N -0.111 -0.116 -0.112
s 1.112 *** 1.114 *** 1.109 ***
r 0.011 -0.020 -0.015
Endog test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overid test 0.352 0.299 0.498
Log-likelihood -3846.88 -3848.46 -3839.23
Total cases 1939 1939 1935
Uncensored 584 584 584
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.
22of public and private institutions.
In what follows, ﬁnancial development is measured, alternatively, by the three stan-
dard ratios introduced in the literature by King and Levine (1993): the share of bank
deposits (DEPOSITS) or the share of bank credit to the private sector (CREDIT) or the
share of liquid liabilities of the ﬁnancial system (LIQUID LIAB), all expressed as a per-
centage of the country GDP 31. These variables enter the model of remittance dated
back to the year of the interview32.
With regard to the home-country institutional quality, it is measured by four indexes
of risk rating by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): economic risk rating
(ECON RISK), political risk rating (POLIT RISK), ﬁnancial risk rating (FIN RISK) and
the composite risk index (COMP RISK) which results from the synthesis of the previous
ones. The ﬁnancial and economic risk indexes are based on a 0-50 scale, POLIT RISK
on a 0-100 scale. The grades from the three indices are then weighted to produce the
Composite Risk Index. Regardless of the scale, the highest overall rating indicates the
lowest risk, and the lowest rating indicates the highest risk. Also institutional variables
enter equation (9) dated back to the year of the interview.
Out of the three different proxies we use for ﬁnancial development, DEPOSITS and
LIQUID LIAB are highly signiﬁcant (1% level), while CREDIT is signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (see table 3). The coefﬁcients are always positive in line with the view of ﬁnance
and remittances as complements, for which countries with more developed ﬁnancial
systems are able to attract larger amounts of remittances. Once we control for ﬁnan-
cial development, the level of per capita GDP does not play a signiﬁcant role in the
remittance main equation anymore. In the selection equation, however, ﬁnancial vari-
ables do not exert any signiﬁcant effect on the probability of being a remitter, while per
capita GDP is still a powerful explanatory variable. Since per capita GDP is meant as a
proxy for the living conditions of relatives in the country of origin, we could conclude
that while altruistic motivations matter in terms of propensity to remit, the amount
of money remitted is primarily determined by a different set of factors regarding the
solidity of the country of origin and its investment opportunities.
Whatever the proxy used for ﬁnancial development, regression results conﬁrm the
importance (and the endogeneity) of immigrant income and consumption for remit-
tance decisions. Estimated coefﬁcients are always signiﬁcant at the 1% level and their
size is slightly larger than in the basic speciﬁcation (1.006-1.065 for income and 2.153-
2.251 for consumption).
Moving on to institutional quality variables, the effects on remittances are mixed (see
Table 4). The composite risk index has no effects on the main and selection equations,
nor has the economic risk index. By contrast, the political and ﬁnancial risks in the
home country exert signiﬁcant but opposite effects on immigrants’ decisions to remit.
Consistent with ﬁndings for ﬁnancial development, where ﬁnancial risks are low, re-
mittance inﬂows are greater on average. However, the soundness of ﬁnancial markets
31DEPOSITS, CREDIT and LIQUID LIAB are constructed from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
We draw these ratios from Beck, Demirguc ¸-K¨ unt, and Levine (2000).
32We also tested the robustness of our results by using the mean value of each of the three ﬁnancial
variables over the period, and results proved qualitatively identical.
23Table 4: IV dependent double-hurdle model: institutional variables
Main equation
const 19.263 *** 19.038 *** 18.902 *** 17.965 ***
MALE 0.254 ** 0.250 ** 0.253 ** 0.241 **
AGE 0.005 0.022 -0.036 -0.059
AGE2 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003
TIME -0.112 -0.183 -0.079 -0.097
CITIZENSHIP -0.552 ** -0.496 * -0.540 ** -0.496 *
RELATIVES 0.508 * 0.543 ** 0.486 * 0.443 *
SCHOOLING 2 -0.292 ** -0.285 ** -0.295 ** -0.278 *
SCHOOLING 3 -0.714 *** -0.667 *** -0.707 *** -0.628 ***
SCHOOLING 4 -0.928 *** -0.886 *** -0.926 *** -0.855 ***





DISTANCE -0.358 * -0.379 * -0.346 * -0.343 *
INCOME 1.017 *** 1.122 *** 0.986 *** 1.037 ***
CONSUMPTION -2.129 *** -2.204 *** -2.076 *** -2.077 ***
Selection equation
const 6.460 *** 6.421 *** 6.653 *** 6.745 ***
MALE 0.136 ** 0.141 ** 0.137 ** 0.141 **
AGE 0.382 * 0.362 0.381 * 0.388 *
AGE2 -0.069 ** -0.067 ** -0.069 ** -0.070 **
TIME 0.000 0.042 -0.023 0.009
CITIZENSHIP 0.270 ** 0.275 ** 0.266 ** 0.259 **
RELATIVES 0.162 0.144 0.174 0.163
SCHOOLING 2 -0.015 -0.017 -0.012 -0.018
SCHOOLING 3 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.024
SCHOOLING 4 0.253 0.249 0.249 0.229





DISTANCE -0.586 *** -0.591 *** -0.598 *** -0.602 ***
GOOD ENG 0.072 0.073 0.078 0.067
FIRST ENG -0.145 * -0.165 ** -0.139 * -0.155 *
CITY -0.060 -0.041 -0.060 -0.046
CHILD -0.147 -0.143 -0.148 -0.143
SPOUSE 0.276 *** 0.283 *** 0.271 *** 0.273 ***
FAMILY N -0.158 -0.165 -0.158 -0.165
s 1.134 1.129 1.135 1.128
r -0.110 -0.045 -0.122 -0.110
Endog test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overid test 0.19 0.31 0.17 0.15
Log-likelihood -3963.84 -3949.04 -3967.5 -3965.73
Total cases 1967 1967 1967 1967
Uncensored 573 573 573 573
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.
24acts as a substitute for the likelihood of immigrants remitting. Political instability in
the country of origin, instead, urges immigrants to help relatives at home, but the sums
remitted tend to be small.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provided empirical evidence about remittance strategies of a panel of
immigrants from 125 different countries who recently settled in Australia. By means
of a simultaneous-equation model, we set remittances in the broader context of house-
holds’ work and consumption decisions, hence addressing the potential problem of
endogeneity, that has seldom been investigated in the existing literature. The censored
nature of the remittance variable is dealt with by estimating a double-hurdle model that
provides higher generality than the customarily used Tobit and Heckit models. A LIML
estimator was developed to contemplate endogenous regressors (in our case, earnings
and consumption) and deal with the selection mechanism at the same time. Our re-
sults show that endogeneity is indeed affecting both immigrants’ pre-transfer earnings
and consumption as determinants of remittance behaviour. Once we take it into ac-
count, the evidence goes in favour of exchange motives governing remittances, even
if altruistic motivation cannot be excluded. Thanks to the cross-country dimension of
our dataset, the last part of our analysis explored the relationship between remittance
strategies and the level of ﬁnancial development and the quality of institutions of immi-
grants’ countries of origin. Although this nexus has already been explored in a number
of recent macro studies, ours is the ﬁrst contribution to investigate it at a micro level in
the context of household decisions.
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A Two simple models of pure altruistic and selsh remittances
In this appendix we present two very simple models for immigrants’ pure-unilateral-
altruistic and pure-exchange remittances and savings decisions. Consider an immi-
grant who lives for two periods. During the ﬁrst period the immigrant is assumed to
earn an incomeYm that he/she can allocate over consumption, savings in the host coun-
try and remittances to the origin family. The immigrant maximises a time-separable
and log-linear utility function deﬁned over ﬁrst- and second-period consumption and,
alternatively, origin-family utility in the ﬁrst period (altruistic transfers) or services ac-
quirable from remittances back home (selﬁsh transfers).
29A.1 Pure altruism
In this case, the maximisation problem is:
max
C1,C2,R
Um = ln(C1) + rln(C2) + gln(Cp)
s.t.
Cp = Yp + R
Ym = C1 + dC2 + R
R  0
where C and Y stand for consumption and income, m and p for immigrant and parental
family, R is the amount of money remitted, r and d are the individual and market inter-
temporal discount factors, and g is the relative degree of altruism. From the ﬁrst order





1+ g + r
Ym  
1+ r
1+ g + r
Yp

and the elasticity of R with respect to Ym
e =
gYm





Um = ln(C1) + rln(C2) + bln(S)
s.t.
S = aR
Ym = C1 + dC2 + R
R  0
where S is the amount of services in the home country acquired by remittances, b is its




1+ b + r
Ym
and the elasticity of R with respect to Ym is equal to 1.
30B Auxiliary tables and gures
Table 5: Main countries of origin of immigrants in LSIA 1
Number of Share of Avg. remittance
Country of Origin households remitters (AUS $)
United Kingdom 315 14.3% 3,650
China 148 37.8% 3,882
India 135 37.0% 3,583
Vietnam 134 47.8% 1,320
Philippines 131 58.0% 2,205
Former Yugoslavia 114 48.2% 2,243
Hong Kong, China 109 22.0% 6,267
South Africa 106 14.2% 5,690
Sri Lanka 96 50.0% 1,464
Iraq 88 62.5% 3,296
Malaysia 82 35.4% 4,278
Indonesia 79 30.4% 1,473
Fiji 77 35.1% 2,033
Germany 70 10.0% 2,129
Myanmar 69 40.6% 1,788
Ukraine 68 27.9% 1,403
Lebanon 67 23.9% 1,425
Korea, Rep. 64 10.9% 1,379
Afghanistan 63 58.7% 2,389
Cambodia 62 37.1% 1,061
Japan 62 8.1% 11,100
Russian Federation 62 32.3% 2,935
Poland 61 19.7% 1,900
Iran, Islamic Rep. 60 16.7% 3,580
Italy 60 6.7% 1,925
Bosnia and Herzegovina 56 53.6% 1,605
Egypt, Arab Rep. 56 23.2% 2,908
Turkey 56 37.5% 1,390
United States 56 10.7% 2,150
Romania 55 41.8% 1,761















































































































32Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
REMITTANCES 1.919 0 9.953 2.974
INCOME 10.505 8.232 11.177 0.689
CONSUMPTION 9.907 7.122 10.955 0.395
MALE 0.416 0 1 0.493
AGE 3.793 1.800 8.700 1.158
TIME 3.444 3.039 4.868 0.127
CITIZENSHIP 0.927 0 1 0.260
RELATIVES 0.946 0 1 0.227
SCHOOLING 2 0.505 0 1 0.500
SCHOOLING 3 0.221 0 1 0.415
SCHOOLING 4 0.114 0 1 0.318
GDP PC 8.814 6.208 10.594 0.986
GDP VOLATILITY 2.880 0.556 15.004 2.361
GDP GROWTH 2.546 -7.324 8.629 2.552
CRI 0.703 0.310 0.913 0.121
PRR 0.703 0.260 0.940 0.144
ERR 0.346 0.095 0.500 0.066
FRR 0.357 0.130 0.495 0.064
CREDIT 0.960 -4.004 0.779 1.011
DEPOSIT 0.959 -5.905 1.166 1.061
LIQUID LIAB 0.694 -2.658 1.168 0.666
DISTANCE 9.269 7.825 9.777 0.390
GOOD ENG 0.621 0 1 0.485
FIRST ENG 0.187 0 1 0.390
CITY 0.974 0 1 0.161
CHILD 0.543 0 1 0.498
SPOUSE 0.750 0 1 0.433
FAMILY N 1.117 0 2.773 0.487
33Table 7: Baseline model: ﬁrst-stage estimates
First stage for log income
coeff. std.err. z-stat p-value
const 9.074 0.476 19.050 0.000 ***
MALE 0.019 0.025 0.746 0.456
TIME 0.102 0.088 1.161 0.245
AGE 0.141 0.092 1.524 0.128
AGE2 -0.028 0.011 -2.589 0.010 ***
SCHOOLING 2 -0.184 0.031 -5.857 0.000 ***
SCHOOLING 3 -0.304 0.044 -6.918 0.000 ***
SCHOOLING 4 -0.206 0.054 -3.809 0.000 ***
CITIZENSHIP -0.046 0.048 -0.955 0.340
RELATIVES -0.005 0.055 -0.091 0.927
GOOD ENG 0.215 0.035 6.132 0.000 ***
FIRST ENG 0.248 0.029 8.609 0.000 ***
CITY 0.100 0.074 1.343 0.179
CHILD -0.442 0.033 -13.340 0.000 ***
SPOUSE 0.176 0.034 5.095 0.000 ***
FAMILY N 0.598 0.036 16.510 0.000 ***
GDP PC 0.085 0.016 5.448 0.000 ***
DISTANCE -0.037 0.035 -1.066 0.287
First stage for log consumption
coeff. std.err. z-stat p-value
const 8.183 0.271 30.200 0.000 ***
MALE 0.009 0.015 0.584 0.559
TIME 0.144 0.054 2.689 0.007 ***
AGE 0.140 0.047 2.996 0.003 ***
AGE2 -0.021 0.005 -3.887 0.000 ***
SCHOOLING 2 -0.080 0.020 -4.040 0.000 ***
SCHOOLING 3 -0.123 0.026 -4.699 0.000 ***
SCHOOLING 4 -0.149 0.034 -4.440 0.000 ***
CITIZENSHIP -0.064 0.028 -2.306 0.021 **
RELATIVES -0.011 0.032 -0.349 0.727
GOOD ENG 0.070 0.018 3.937 0.000 ***
FIRST ENG 0.122 0.017 7.200 0.000 ***
CITY 0.159 0.037 4.242 0.000 ***
CHILD -0.055 0.021 -2.569 0.010 **
SPOUSE 0.168 0.021 8.019 0.000 ***
FAMILY N 0.277 0.024 11.620 0.000 ***
GDP PC 0.066 0.009 7.746 0.000 ***
DISTANCE -0.003 0.020 -0.145 0.885
34Table 8: Reduced-form double-hurdle model vs. Heckit and Tobit
Double hurdle Heckit Tobit
Main equation
const 8.678 *** 8.678 *** 32.767 ***
MALE 0.253 ** 0.253 ** 0.970 **
TIME -0.043 -0.042 0.481
AGE 0.247 0.247 2.543 *
AGE2 -0.043 -0.043 -0.461 **
SCHOOLING 2 -0.249 * -0.249 * -0.483
SCHOOLING 3 -0.585 *** -0.585 *** -0.466
SCHOOLING 4 -0.611 *** -0.611 *** 0.355
CITIZENSHIP -0.554 ** -0.554 ** 1.834 **
RELATIVES 0.522 * 0.522 * 2.214 **
GDP PC 0.137 0.137 -1.830 ***
DISTANCE -0.308 * -0.308 * -3.026 ***
GOOD ENG 0.249 ** 0.249 ** 0.703
FIRST ENG -0.048 -0.048 -1.502 ***
CITY -0.419 -0.419 -0.500
CHILD -0.173 -0.173 1.818 ***
SPOUSE -0.189 -0.189 -0.896
FAMILY N -0.122 -0.122 -1.140 **
l -0.081
Selection equation
const 4.795 *** 4.795 ***
MALE 0.130 ** 0.130 **
TIME 0.052 0.052
AGE 0.331 0.331
AGE2 -0.062 ** -0.062 **
SCHOOLING 2 -0.058 -0.058
SCHOOLING 3 -0.031 -0.031
SCHOOLING 4 0.109 0.109
CITIZENSHIP 0.290 ** 0.290 **
RELATIVES 0.304 ** 0.304 **
GOOD ENG 0.092 0.092
FIRST ENG -0.225 *** -0.225 ***
CITY -0.073 -0.073
CHILD -0.114 -0.114
SPOUSE -0.169 ** -0.169 **
FAMILY N 0.288 *** 0.288 ***
GDP PC -0.275 *** -0.275 ***
DISTANCE -0.431 *** -0.431 ***
Log-likelihood -2219.949 -2219.949 -2936.272
Vuong Test vs. double-hurdle 0.108 26.819
Vuong Test p-value 0.543 1
Total cases 2168 2168 2168
Uncensored 654 654 654
Note:
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